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Shockey: Nonresident Jurisdiction in Wyoming: An Analysis of Jurisdiction

COMMENT
NONRESIDENT JURISDICTION IN WYOMING: AN
ANALYSIS OF JURISDICTION IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY AND LIBEL LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION

In 1967, the Wyoming Legislature passed a long-arm
statute.' Its stated purpose was "to increase the protection
which Wyoming's courts can provide its citizens, by enlarging the personal jurisdiction of Wyoming courts over persons
outside Wyoming and providing additional methods of service of process." 2 Based on the only major case' decided under
this statutory scheme by the Wyoming Supreme Court, it is
arguable whether this purpose has been fulfilled by the
statute. The decision has been criticized in a prior issue of
the Land and Water Law Review.4
Wyoming's long-arm statute has also been interpreted
three times recently in the Federal District Court for Wyoming. In the first of these decisions,5 it appeared that a
liberal approach consonant with the purpose of the statute
was being adopted. However, two later decisions involving
products liability6 and libel7 indicate that a more restrictive
analysis may also be employed at the federal level in
Wyoming.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the jurisdictional problem in Wyoming. A general background is followed by an in-depth analysis of the jurisdictional problem in
two contexts--products liability and libel. These two areas
of concentration have been chosen because of the recent deciCopyright@ 1976 by the University of Wyoming

1. Wyo. STAT. §§ 5-4.1 to -4.3 (Supp. 1975).
2. Ch. 237, [1967] Sessions Laws of Wyoming 689. For a general discussion
of the statutory scheme, see Comment, The "Long-Arm" Statute: Wyoming
Expands Jurisdiction of the State Courts over Non-Residents, 4 LAND &
WATER L. Rnv. 235 (1969).
3. Cozzens v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 514 P.2d 1375 (Wyo. 1973).
4. Note, In Pereonam,Jurisdiction&verForeignCorporationsDealing Indirectly with the State: Application, 9 LAND & WATER L. Rsv. 649 (1974).
5. Leff v. Berger, 383 F. Supp. 441 (D. Wyo. 1974).
6. Prehoda v. Hines Lumber Co., 399 F. Supp. 643 (D. Wyo. 1975).
7. Whitaker v. Denver Post Inc., 401 F. Supp. 60 (D. Wyo. 1975). This case
is currently on appeal to the 10th Circuit.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1976

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 11 [1976], Iss. 2, Art. 8

558

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XI

sions in Wyoming's Federal District Court. Additionally,
the products liability and libel areas are illustrative of the
varying analyses which may be attached to a jurisdictional
inquiry.
As the discussion proceeds, two propositions are developed. First, it is proposed that long-arm statutes and their
interpretations by courts often tend to obscure the purpose
of expanding states' jurisdictional authority. This effect is
due to the courts' concern with a threshold question of whether a particular statute by its terms covers the facts of the
case being decided. Thus, in cases decided under a long-arm
statute, a court looks first to the applicability of the statute.
This inquiry gives the defendant an argument separate from
constitutional due process considerations by which an escape
from jurisdiction may be attempted. Second, it is proposed
that the line of reasoning adopted by courts upholding jurisdiction is generally the more commendable approach. Except
in extreme cases, the better approach is one in which the
jurisdictional authority of a particular court is determined
by a liberal analysis of relevant factors favoring the exercise
of jurisdiction.
The discussion is designed to facilitate preparation of
arguments by both plaintiff and defense attorneys. For the
plaintiff, a declaration by the court that jurisdictional authority does not exist in his home forum may dictate extreme
expense and inconvenience in maintaining a suit elsewhere
and may prevent the maintenance of a suit altogether. For
the defendant, the ability to avoid litigation in the plaintiff's
forum may reduce expenses and inconvenience considerably,
and perhaps may mean an avoidance of the suit entirely.
BACKGROUND

A. Constitutional
Three decisions by the United States Supreme Court
have partially delineated the boundaries of expansion of personal jurisdiction. The cases have been so frequently discusshttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol11/iss2/8
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ed that any mention of them becomes almost automatically
redundant. However, their principles are so important that
a brief discussion is necessary to facilitate any further inquiry in the jurisdictional analysis. It should be borne in
mind that these decisions were principally concerned with
due process limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction, rather
than the operation of long-arm statutes. Thus, the decisions
in these cases help answer the question of whether or not
it is consonant with the precepts of due process to exercise
jurisdiction in a particular case.
In InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,' the question
was whether Washington courts could exercise jurisdiction
over a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of
business in Missouri, which employed 11 to 13 salesmen in
Washington. In sustaining the jurisdictional power of the
Washington courts, the United States Supreme Court laid
out a test that jurisdiction could be exercised if the nonresident had "certain minimum contacts [with the forum]
such that maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "' If the requirements of minimal contact with the forum are met, then the
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident does not deny
due process of law. In assessing the contacts of the defendant,
the InternationalShoe Court considered the following factors
as relevant:
1. An estimate of the inconveniences which would
result to the nonresident from a trial away from
its "home" or principal place of business.
2. Whether the activities by the nonresident are
continuous or sporadic.
3. The nature, quality and circumstances of occasional acts committed in the forum by a nonresident.
4. The jurisdictional test cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative.
8. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9. Id. at 316.
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5. The quality and nature of the activity of the
defendant in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws is the controlling
inquiry to determine whether due process is violated or upheld by the exercise of jurisdiction.
6. To the extent that a nonresident enjoys the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum
state, it enjoys the benefits and protections of
the laws of that state and it is not unfair to
expect the nonresident to answer for obligations
arising out of the exercise of such privileges."
Several years later, in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co.," the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether jurisdiction could properly be exercised in
California over a Texas corporation whose only contacts with
California had been through the mail in connection with an
insurance policy issued to the plaintiff. In finding that the
Due Process clause did not bar the exercise of jurisdiction
in the case, the Court noted that the transformation of the
national economy has dictated an expansion of jurisdictional
authority for state courts.2 The McGee Court laid out further considerations to be taken into account in the jurisdictional analysis:
1. The interest of the forum state in providing an
effective means of redress for its residents.
2. The availability of witnesses who can testify to
material facts or issues in the litigation.
3. Inconvenience to the defendant by itself may not
amount to a denial of due process.'"
Although it has been argued that the McGee decision reduced
the requirements of contact with the forum to a single transaction, the Wyoming Supreme Court has dismissed such an
argument as "hardly... tenable".'4
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 317-19.
355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Id. at 222-23.
Id. at 223-24.
Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886, 894 (Wyo. 1963).
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In Hanson v. Denckla,5 the Supreme Court set out what
has come to be known as the "purposeful availment" test
for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. The Court stated
that in order to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident, "it
is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws."'" Although recognizing that progress in interstate commerce has increased
the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents" and that progress in communications and transportations has made the
defense of a suit in a foreign forum less burdensome,"8 the
Court warned that "it is a mistake to assume this trend
heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts."'"
Under these United States Supreme Court cases, the
constitutional principle which has emerged is often understood as meaning that in order to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction in a particular case, the concern is whether or
not a defendant's rights to due process of law would be
violated if the defendants were forced to answer a suit in
a foreign forum. The concern for the defendant's inconvenience and expense in defending in a foreign forum and
the requirement that he "purposefully avail" himself of privileges in the forum state are expressions of an intent by
the Court that a nonresident not be burdened unfairly.
However, there also exists in these decisions an implicit
recognition by the Court that a plaintiff has rights too. The
Court has recognized that the plaintiff's state may well have
a strong interest in providing an effective means of redress
for one of its residents. And although there may be a requirement that a defendant "purposefully avail" itself of the
privileges of the forum state, once this is done the plaintiff
has a right to expect the defendant to answer for obligations
arising out of the defendant's activities.
15. 357 U.s. 235 (1958).
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 253.
Id. at 251.
Id.
Id.
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Inevitably the jurisdictional inquiry has become one
of weighing these rights of the plaintiff against those of
the defendant. In the absence of explicit standards from
the United States Supreme Court as to what activities amount
to sufficient "minimum contacts" or a "purposeful availment", lower federal courts and state courts are left to their
own devices to make such determinations. And although the
courts studiously apply the guidelines set forth by the
Supreme Court, the results are as variable as the number
of cases decided.
B. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp."
Although not a United States Supreme Court decision,
the ruling in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. has achieved such notoriety that an understanding of its facts and rationale is essential to understanding
modern principles of nonresident jurisdiction. In the Gray
case, the issue was whether jurisdiction could be exercised
over the Titan Valve Manufacturing Company, which allegedly negligently constructed a safety valve. Titan was an
Ohio corporation and had constructed the valve outside Illinois and sold the valves to American Radiator and Standard
Sanitary Corporation outside Illinois. Only the injury to
the plaintiff occurred in Illinois.
Illinois had recently enacted a statute 1 which subjected
nonresidents who committed a tortious act in Illinois to
service of process and jurisdiction. Titan argued both 1)
that the statute did not apply and 2) that if it did, to apply
it would be to violate Titan's rights to due process of law.
The court first decided that the statute did apply because
the alleged negligence could not be separated from the resulting injury. Therefore, Titan had committed a "tortious act"
in Illinois and was subject to jurisdictional authority of the
Illinois courts. 2 Titan argued with this conclusion by main20. 22 Ii. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
21. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 1-7(1)(b) (1959).
22. Gray, supra note 20, at 762-63. The court partially relied on the conflict
of laws concept that the place of wrong is where the last event takes place
which is necessary to render the actor liable. It is interesting to note that
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taining that by using the words "tortious act" rather than
"tort", the Illinois Legislature intended the statute to cover
only the act or conduct allegedly wrongful, separate from any
consequence therefrom. The Illinois court rejected this, declaring that "to be tortious an act must cause injury."23
This type of argument has become the trademark of
decisions under long-arm statutes. Purportedly designed to
facilitate a determination as to whether jurisdiction can or
should be exercised, long-arm statutes actually often tend
to cloud the issue even further. Whereas the United States
Supreme Court has basically limited itself to the consideration of the constitutional principle of due process of law,
decisions under long-arm statutes first must address the
threshold question of whether the statute by its terms is
intended to cover the factual situation of the case being
decided. This necessarily gives rise to various semantic interpretations of what acts or conduct amount to a "tortious
act" or "commiting a tort" or "causing tortious injury".
Practically, this gives the defendant an additional argument
against the exercise of jurisdiction. Only when the pertinent
statute or case law authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction to
the constitutional limits24 is such an inquiry avoided.
The Gray court went on to analyze the due process
argument made by Titan which was that to exercise jurisdiction where the defendant's only contact with the forum
was the injury would exceed the bounds of the due process.
The court rejected this argument and effectively decided
that the "contact" of causing injury in a state is sufficient
to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident.
although Wyoming has never explicitly adopted this rule in the jurisdictional context, an Iowa court has concluded that Wyoming follows the
rule that an injury is a requisite to the commission of a tort. In Anderson
v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 257 Iowa 911, 135 N.W.2d 639 (1965), the
Iowa court quoted the Wyoming Supreme Court decision in Price v. State
Highway Comm'n, 62 Wyo. 385, 167 P.2d 309, 312 (1946), which said,
"Generally speaking and without undertaking in the least an all inclusive
definition, a tort has a meaning somewhat similar to wrong and is an unlawful act injurious to another independent of contract." To the Iowa court,
at least, this definition meant that in Wyoming a wrong is a prerequisite
to and an integral part of the commission of a tort.
23. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra note 20,
at 763.

24. For example, see CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); N.J. R. Civ.
PRO. 4:4-4(e); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-5-33 (1956).
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C. Wyoming Decisions: State
The Wyoming Supreme Court has twice considered the
issue of nonresident jurisdiction in detail. The first of these
cases was decided prior to the enactment of the present longarm statute. In Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello," the issue was
whether jurisdiction could be exercised over Ford in an action
for personal injuries from the negligent manufacture of an
automobile. The Wyoming Supreme Court generally adopted
the guidelines laid out by the United States Supreme Court
in the InternationalShoe, McGee, and Hanson cases as discussed above and sustained the jurisdictional authority over
2
Ford.
Subsequent to the adoption of Wyoming's long-arm statute, the Wyoming Supreme Court had occasion to consider
its effect in Cozzens v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 7 In the case,
the Wyoming Supreme Court sustained a motion to dismiss
an action against several nonresident defendants who were
connected with a plane which had crashed in Colorado. Although all the defendants had some contacts with Wyoming,
the court did not view such contacts as being substantial
enough to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. The decision
has been said to have "deviated from the broad standard
previously announced in Arguello and instead employed a
quantitative approach whereby the amount of actual in-state
activity was the criteria for interpreting jurisdictional pro,,."
While it may be debatable whether Cozzens
priety .
was a proper decision on its facts, there can be little doubt
that the rationale of the decision did lay the groundwork in
Wyoming for more restrictive decisions under the long-arm
statute. " It is perhaps unfortunate that in the only juris25. Supra, note 14.
26. For more detailed discussions of the Arguello case, see Comment, The
"Long-Arm" Statute: Wyoming Ezpands Jurisdiction of the State Courts
over Non-Residents, supra, note 2, at 240-41, and Note, In Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign CorporationsDealing Indirectly with the State: Application, supra, note 4. at 665-57.
27. Supra note 3.
28. Note, In Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations Dealing Indirectly with the State: Application, supra note 4, at 649.
29. Although distinguished in Leff v. Berger, supra note 5, the Cozzens decision received much consideration in Prehoda v. Hines Lumber Co., supra
note 6, and Whitaker v. Denver Post Inc., supra note 7.
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dictional case decided under the long-arm statute by the
Wyoming Supreme Court, the cause of action definitely
arose in another state. This dictated a more restrictive
interpretation by the court."0
D. Wyoming Decisions:Federal
The Tenth Circuit has had occasion to consider one case
arising under Wyoming's long-arm statute. In Pullen v.
Hughes," a wrongful death action, Mansfield Tire and Rubber Company, an Ohio tire manufacturer, was named as a
defendant. Mansfield by affidavit demonstrated that it had
no business contacts with the State of Wyoming. The Tenth
Circuit dismissed Mansfield from the action on the grounds
that Mansfield did not pursue a regular course of business
in Wyoming, and was, therefore, not amenable to jurisdiction of the Wyoming courts under the provisions of Section
5-4.2 (a) (iv) of the Wyoming Statutes.2
In Leff v. Berger,8 the defendant Berger had entered
into a 10 year lease with the plaintiffs. About a year later,
he left the state and failed to make further payments under
the lease. The plaintiffs instituted an action to recover proceeds due under the lease. The defendant challenged the
jurisdiction of the court and service of process, claiming
that he had no contacts with the State of Wyoming and was
an Illinois resident. The court disagreed, and held that the
defendant was subject to process and jurisdiction in
Wyoming.
The reasoning in the decision in Leff v. Berger began
with an analysis of InternationalShoe and extracted certain
principles from that case:
1. Judicial jurisdiction depends upon reasonableness.
30. "However, when the cause arises in another state the activities of the
foreign corporation must be substantial to satisfy the requirements of
minimal contact." Cozzens v. Piper Aircraft Corp., supra note 3 at 1378.
31. 481 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1973).
32. Text quoted infra note 44.
33. Supra note 5.
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2. Due process permits jurisdiction to extend to
"continuous and systematic" activities within
a state and also to "occasional acts" which by
their nature may be deemed to be sufficient.
3. Due process requires an analysis of the quality
of acts in a forum rather than their quantity,
in relation to fair administration of the laws."
The decision went on to refer to Wyoming's long-arm statute
as a "single act""3 statute and further stated that the statute's purpose clause 6 clearly indicated that the statute was
intended "to extend state court jurisdiction to the constitutional limit.""7 Cozzens"s was distinguished by recognizing that in it the cause of action arose in another state. The
court found that by entering into a lease in Wyoming and
organizing a business in Wyoming, the defendant had availed
himself of the laws of the state and was amenable to the
jurisdiction of Wyoming courts. The fact that witnesses
to the transaction were likely to be in Wyoming was also
considered as important. The court declared that the longarm statute "is remedial and entitled to liberal interpretation, consonant with principles of due process," and upheld
the exercise of jurisdiction."
Perhaps the decision in Leff v. Berger was simplified
by the fact that the long-arm statute expressly provided for
the factual situation in the case. Section 5-4.2 (a) (v) of the
long-arm provisions expressly authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over persons having an interest in or possessing real
property in the state. There was little doubt that the scope
of this provision included a defendant who was the lessee of
property in Wyoming. Thus, the threshold question of the
long-arm statute's applicability was easily disposed of in
Leff v. Berger, and the due process analysis was not unduly
burdened or confused. The court was readily inclined to
adopt a relatively liberal approach to the question.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 443.
Id. at 444.
Ch. 237, [1967] Session Laws of Wyoming 689.
Leff v. Berger, supra note 5, at 444.
Cozzens v. Piper Aircraft Corp., supra note 3.
Id. at 445.
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The situation was different in Prehoda v. Hines Lumber Co.4 Raygo-Wagner, Inc., one of the defendants, was
an Oregon corporation which manufactured log loaders.
Raygo-Wagner had a distributorship in Oregon which did
business as the Howard Cooper Company. Hines Lumber
Company purchased a piece of equipment from Howard
Cooper Company which was manufactured by Raygo-Wagner.
While working one day, Bruce Averett was killed due to
alleged defects in the machinery. His administrator brought
suit to recover damages.
Raygo-Wagner moved to dismiss the case on the grounds
of a lack of personal jurisdiction. Without even entering
into an analysis of which provisions of the long-arm statute
did or did not apply, the court agreed that there was no
jurisdiction in the case. The facts that the design and construction of the machine were in Oregon, that the machine
reached Wyoming through an independent distributorship,
and a general paucity of contacts by Raygo-Wagner with
Wyoming were said to be dispositive of the jurisdictional
question. The court said that this was a single act and one
injury, and that the reasoning in Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello4
to the effect that a single transaction would not sustain
jurisdiction was controlling, at least on the facts presented.
Shortly after the Hines Lumber decision, the federal
district court issued its opinion in Whitaker v. Denver Post
Inc.42 Whitaker and Anselmi had filed separate actions for
libel in state court and the cases were removed to federal
court. Times Mirror Company, the publisher of the Los
Angeles Times, was named as a defendant for publishing
allegedly libelous materials in the Los Angeles Times about
Whitaker and Anselmi. Times Mirror moved for dismissal
on the grounds that the Wyoming court lacked personal
jurisdiction over it.
40. Supra note 6.
41. Supra note 14. This conclusion was reached despite the court's statement
in Leff v. Berger, supra note 5, at 444, that the statute is a "single-act"
statute.
42. Supra note ?.
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The court stated the issue as being whether Times Mirror was qualified to do business in Wyoming so as to bring
it within the provisions of the long-arm statute. The circulation of the Los Angeles Times in Wyoming between 1971
and 1975 was at a maximum of 16 daily and 26 Sunday
editions. Five reporters had been sent to Wyoming by Times
Mirror Company, on different occasions, three of them in
connection with the allegedly defamatory articles. Times
Mirror Company had occasionally solicited advertising in
Wyoming.
The court reasoned that Subsection (a) (iii) of the longarm statute" did not cover the factual situation because the
"act" (printing the article) occurred in California, not Wyoming. An assumption that Wyoming follows the single publication rule was utilized to reach this conclusion.
However, the court said that jurisdiction might be
authorized under Subsection (a) (iv) " of the long-arm statute. This statutory provision was interpreted as attaching
a "doing business" requisite to the assumption of jurisdiction in the case. Additionally, it was stated that in libel suits,
First Amendment considerations required a greater showing
of contacts. In light of these considerations, the court held
that the Times Mirror Company was not subject to jurisdiction in Wyoming.
E. Background:Review
The foregoing discussion has set out the major authority
pertaining to the exercise of jurisdiction in Wyoming over
nonresidents. Undoubtedly, the state of the case law leaves
many questions unanswered for the Wyoming practitioner.
For that reason, the remainder of this article addresses itself
to a discussion of how the nonresident jurisdiction analysis
has been handled in other jurisdictions. The areas of products
43. WYO. STAT.

§ 54.2(a) (iii) (Supp. 1975) states: "causing tortious injury by
an act or omission in this state."
44. Wyo. STAT. § 5-4.2(a) (iv) (Supp. 1975) states: "causing tortious injury in
this state by an act or omission outside this state if he regularly does or
solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct in
this state or derives substantial revenue from goods consumed or services
used in this state."
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liability and libel have been chosen due to their generally
universal applicability to other problem areas.
Additionally, the principal focus of the following discussion is on the applicability of statutory provisions similar
to Section 5-4.2(a) (iii) of the Wyoming Statutes which
authorizes jurisdiction over nonresidents "causing tortious
injury by an act or omission in this state." The reasons for
choosing this area of concentration are twofold. First, the
Arguello,"5 Cozzens," Berger, Prehoda,and Whitaker" cases
offer discussions which are relevant to other provisions in the
long-arm statute. Some of these decisions have seriously
constricted the effectiveness of Subsection (a) (iv) of the
statute. Therefore, other bases for jurisdiction must be explored. Second, Subsection (a) (iii) offers the most potential
for either an extremely liberal approach or a quite restrictive
approach to the jurisdictional question in the products liability and libel areas of the law. The discussion therefore
facilitates a consideration of both extremes, as well as the
middle ground, in the jurisdictional debate.
4
JURISDICTION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES 8

The following discussion is subdivided into considerations against jurisdiction, state and federal, and considerations for jurisdiction, state and federal. It should be noted
that for a state like Wyoming, with little industrial and
manufacturing activity within its borders, the likelihood that
products liability cases will be argued in federal court is
extremely high. This is because such cases are particularly
amenable to a removal proceeding even if they are initially
brought in state court.
Additionally, the following discussion is intended to
focus upon the type of long-arm statute involved. From this
45. Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, supra note 14.
46. Cozzens v. Piper Aircraft Corp., supra note 3.
47. Leff v. Berger, supra note 5; Prehoda v. Hines Lumber Co., supra note 6;
Whitaker v. Denver Post Inc., supra note 7.

48. For extensive discussions in this area, se Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 13 (1968),
and Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 532 (1969).
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perspective, the reader may see the variety of intrepretive approaches adopted by courts in addressing the threshold question of whether a particular long-arm statute is
applicable to the facts of the case. It is suggested that the
reasoning in such inquiries is often strained, regardless of
whether the ultimate decision favors or rejects an assertion
of jurisdiction. Rather than addressing the ultimate question of whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with
due process requisites, the courts tend to fall into a sisyphean
inquiry into the meaning of the words "tort" or "tortious
conduct" or "act" and sometimes resolve the case on such a
determination. In cases where jurisdiction is denied, this
approach negates the general long-arm purposes of expanding jurisdiction.
A. The Case Against Jurisdiction:State
1. Statutory Applicability
The most significant decision in the products liability
area by a state court which denied jurisdiction was the
"triple decision" in Longines-Wittenauer Watch Co. v. Barnes
& Reinecke, Inc.49 The applicable statute in that case authorized the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident who "commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of
action for defamation of character arising from the act."
The factual situation in the Longines part of the opinion
actually had to do with a contract, but the facts of the
Feathers v. McLucas and Singer v. Walker cases involved
torts. In Feathers,a tractor-drawn steel tank manufactured
by a Kansas corporation, Darby Corporation, exploded near
the Feathers home and caused damage. Darby had no other
relevant contacts with the state of New York. The court
decided on these facts that Darby did not commit a
tortious act in New York and was therefore not subject to
jurisdiction under the terms of the statute. The court criticized the decision in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp.5" as exceeding the bounds of "sound statutory
49. 15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68 (1965). Also decided in the
same opinion were the companion eases of Feathers v. McLucas and Singer
v. Walker.
50. Supra note 20.
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construction" 1 and said that the "mere occurrence of the
injury in this state certainly cannot serve to transmute an
out-of-state tortious act into one committed here within the
sense of the statutory wording."'" Similar reasoning was
employed in the Singer case. A young plaintiff was in Connecticut using a rock hammer which had been manufactured
in Illinois and purchased for him by his aunt in New York.
The court held that the tortious act occurred in Illinois and
that the New York court did not have jurisdiction in the case.
In response to the decision in these cases, the New York Legislature amended the long-arm statute to cover such situations
more explicitly."
Contrasting the Feathers v. McLucas and Singer v.
Walker decisions with the decision in Gray v. American
Radiator& StandardSanitary Corp. illustrates the semantic
battle that is often waged under the provisions of long-arm
statutes. The statutory wording was very similar in all the
cases. The decisions were exactly opposite. The initial concern for the practitioner in such cases therefore becomes the
semantico-legal interpretation which a court will employ for
the long-arm statute involved.
2. Due Process Limitations
Two recent decisions in Washington and Oregon illustrate another limitation which state courts are likely to
impose on the applicability of their long-arm statutes. In
Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 4 the plaintiff had purchased a Rambler from a dealer in Oregon. While in Washington, a defective exhaust system on the car caused injury.
The Oregon dealer moved for dismissal on the grounds that
it was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Washington courts. The applicable statute authorized the exercise
of jurisdiction over nonresidents who occasioned "the commission of a tortious act within this state."" Though ambiguous as to the applicability of the statute, the court reasoned
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Feathers v. McLucas, supra note 49, at 79.
Id. at 77.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 302 (1966 amendment).
70 Wash. 2d 875, 425 P.2d 647 (1967).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185(1) (b) (1961).
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that jurisdiction was lacking in Washington because the
defendant Oregon car dealer did not do any purposeful act
in Washington. The court reasoned that to attach jurisdiction only on the basis that an out-of-state purchaser subsequently brought a car to Washington was not justified.
A similar result was reached in Pellegrini v. Sachs &
Sons.56 The plaintiffs had purchased a car in California
from a dealer there and moved to Utah. The suit was based
on a claim of negligence in dealer preparation. The statute
authorized jurisdiction for "the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by breach of warranty."57
Although never explicitly deciding whether the statute was
applicable by its terms, the court said jurisdiction was lacking because there was no showing that the defendant California car dealer had done anything in Utah which constituted a purposeful minimum contact. The court said it was
important to distinguish between a defendant who puts his
products into commerce with the expectation that the products
may move to other states and the defendant who expects his
products to remain locally. The California car dealer, according to the court, could reasonably assume that most of the
cars he sold would remain locally and therefore should not
be expected to answer to a suit in Utah.
The Oliver and Pelligrini cases illustrate a part of the
doctrine which has come to be known as the "stream of commerce" 8 doctrine. Under this analysis, an important consideration is whether a manufacturer could reasonably expect
that his products will be utilized in foreign forums. If not,
then the analysis disfavors the exercise of jurisdiction. However, if the manufacturer can reasonably expect widespread
distribution, gains economically from such distribution, and/
or solicits a market for his products on a widespread basis,
then the analysis favors the exercise of jurisdiction.
56. 522 P.2d 704 (Utah 1974).
57. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2!7-24(3) (1953).
58. See discussion in Note, In Personin Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations
Dealing Indirectly with the State: Application, supra note 4, at 660-61.
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B. The Case Against Jurisdiction:Federal
Several federal decisions have denied the exercise of
jurisdiction in products liability cases on the ground that
the applicable state long-arm statute did not authorize the
exercise of jurisdiction by its terms. In a case decided before
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 9
an Illinois federal court in Heliriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co."
denied jurisdiction on the basis that although the damage
occurred in Illinois, the acts amounting to a "tortious act"
occurred outside Illinois. The Second Circuit adopted the
reasoning in the Longines-Feathers-Singercases 6' to deny
jurisdiction in Harvey v. Chemie Grunentha.2 In that case,
the plaintiff sued a German manufacturer for injuries sustained when his wife in New York took Thalidomide pills
manufactured in Germany. The court reasoned that the
defendant had not committed a tortious act in New York
and was therefore not subject to jurisdiction there. In Lichina
v. FuturaInc.," a Colorado district court also adopted the
interpretation of the Feathers" case in denying jurisdiction
under a statute providing for jurisdiction for "the commission of a tortious act within this state.""5 However, the court
did authorize the exercise of jurisdiction on another theory.
In DiMeo v. Minister Machine Co.6" jurisdiction was denied
on various grounds, including the fact that in the court's
opinion, "tortious conduct" occurred at the place of manufacture, Michigan, not in the place of injury, Connecticut.
Two federal cases illustrate the importance of meticulous pleading in products liability cases when jurisdiction
is likely to be questionable. In Standard v. Meadors,7 the
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.
65.

66.
67.

Supre note 20.
157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
Supra note 49.
354 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. den. 384 U.S. 1001 (1966).
260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966). The action was against Riblet Tramway Co., a Washington corporation whose equipment caused injury in
Colorado. The court stated, at 254, that "both the asserted negligent act
or acts of the non-resident defendant, as well as the injury they produce,
must occur within the state of Colorado", quoting from an opinion in Arter
v. X-Acto, Inc., (#8976), Order of October 9, 1965.
Feathers v. McLucas, supra note 49.
CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27-1 (C) (Supp. 1966).
225 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1963).
347 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
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pertinent statute authorized jurisdiction over nonresident
corporations who were guilty of tortious conduct in Georgia.
The complaint alleged negligence in the design and manufacture of a boat which injured the plaintiff. The court
reasoned that since the design and manufacture of the boat
occurred outside the State of Georgia, and that viewing the
complaint and the statute together jurisdiction would be
denied. In Block Industries v. DHJ Industries, Inc., 8 a
South Dakota plaintiff had sued Block Industries for injuries
sustained when a shirt he was wearing caught fire. Block
moved to join four fabric manufacturers, including DHJ
Industries, as third party defendants. These third party
defendants moved for dismissal on the grounds of lack of
personal jurisdiction. The court emphasized that in its third
party complaint and in argument, Block had failed to demonstrate the extent, if any, of DHJ's contacts with South
Dakota. Block had not even demonstrated that DHJ was the
manufacturer of the fabric in the injurious shirt, so jurisdiction was not authorized under a statute providing for
jurisdiction for "the commission of any act which results
in accrual within this state of a tort action." 9 The court
did give Block the opportunity to discover which manufacturer's fabric was in the shirt and to proceed accordingly
later. Both the Meadors and Block cases illustrate that the
pleading stage may be important in the products liability
jurisdictional context. To avoid this result, the plaintiff
should plead all possible theories for recovery and take care
to frame the pleading in language which fits the pertinent
long-arm provisions.
In spite of a series of cases decided in state court in
Minnesota favoring the exercise of jurisdiction"0 over nonresidents in products liability cases, the federal district court
for Minnesota has denied such jurisdiction on several occasions. The first of these, Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc.,7 1 came
before the jurisdiction-favoring state court decisions. In the
case, the Minnesota plaintiff sued for injuries caused by an
68.
69.
70.
'71.

495 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1974).
S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 15-7-2 (1967).
These cases will be discussed in later sections of this article.
172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959).
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allegedly defective office chair manufactured by the defendant outside Minnesota. The pertinent statute authorized
jurisdiction over the nonresident who "commits a tort in
whole or in part in Minnesota against a resident of Minnesota." The court dismissed the action on the grounds that
the tort was not committed in Minnesota, as the defendant
had manufactured the chair elsewhere and had committed no
tortious act in Minnesota. Subsequently, in Pendzimas v.
Eastern Metal Products Corp.," the Minnesota federal court
acknowledged that more liberal interpretations had been
given to the Minnesota long-arm statute. Jurisdiction was
denied, however, on the ground that when only the injury
occurs in a state and there are no other relevant contacts,
especially no purposeful marketing in the state, jurisdiction
should be denied. And in Uppgren v. Executive Aviation
Services, Inc. 4 the court decided that it would be inconsistent
with the precepts of due process to subject a Maryland helicopter corporation whose only contact with Minnesota was
the crash of a helicopter there to jurisdiction of the Minnesota courts. The court considered the fact that the crash
had occurred in Minnesota as "fortuitous" and said that the
manufacturer could not foresee substantial use of his product
in Minnesota. The travel burden for the defendant was
viewed as too inconvenient and jurisdiction was denied as
violative of due process.
C. The Case Favoring Jurisdiction:State
1. Committing a Tort "In Whole or in Part" in the Forum
Jurisdiction has frequently been upheld in states which
have statutes authorizing the exercise of jurisdiction over a
defendant who "commits a tort in whole or in part" in the
forum state. Two such cases come from the state of Iowa.
In Anderson v. National Presto Industries, Inc.,17 a Wisconsin based coffeemaker manufacturer was sued by an
Iowa resident. The court reasoned that a tort occurs where
72. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13(3) (1957 Amendment).
73. 218 F. Supp. 524 (D. Minn. 1961). The case was a suit for negligence in
the manufacture of a deep fryer.
74. 304 F. Supp. 165 (D. Minn. 1969).
75. Supra note 22.
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the last necessary act (the injury) occurs and that jurisdiction was therefore authorized under the Iowa statute."
A similar conclusion was reached in Tice v. Wilmington Chemical Corp.,7 7 a case against an Illinois water repellant manufacturer whose product exploded while being used by the
plaintiff. Another case favoring jurisdiction under such a
statute was decided in Missouri.78
Minnesota cases decided under a statute authorizing
the exercise of jurisdiction for the commission of a tort in
whole or in part in Minnesota also support the exercise of
jurisdiction over the nonresident in products liability cases. 9
The most interesting of these cases is Ehlers v. U.S. Heating
& Cooling Manufacturing Corp.,8" in which a boiler purportedly caused a fire damaging the plaintiff's property. The
defendant boiler manufacturer was a Delaware corporation
with its principal place of business in Ohio, where the boiler
was manufactured. The defendant had absolutely no contacts with Minnesota--even the boiler at issue had arrived
in Minnesota through intermediate parties. The court held
that on these facts the defendant had committed a tort in
whole or in part in Minnesota because the damage had
occurred there. No due process problems were found in
exercising jurisdiction, the court noting that since the defendant had not raised an argument as to the lack of foreseeability that its product might end up in Minnesota, there
was no due process bar to the exercise of jurisdiction.
Whether these cases decided under statutes referring
to the commission of a tort in whole or in part in the forum
state have any extrapolative authoritative value in Wyoming
is debatable. Wyoming's statute, as it will be recalled, authorizes jurisdiction over those causing tortious injury by an
act or omission in this state. It could well be argued that
76. IOWA CODE § 617.3 (1963) ("commits a tort in whole or in part in Iowa
against a resident of Iowa").
77. 141 N.W.2d 616 (Iowa 1966).
78. State ex rel. Deere & Co., 454 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1970).
79. Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888
(1960); Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607
(1961); Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124
N.W.2d 824 (1963).
80. Supra note 79.
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literally interpreted, this Wyoming statutory provision requires both the injury and the act producing it to occur in
Wyoming. The "tort in whole or in part" statutes may be,
by their own terms, somewhat broader. However, the cases
decided under such statutes do indicate a desire by state
courts to have their statutes include a broad range of factual
settings.
2. "Committing a Tortious Act" in the Forum
Cases decided under statutes authorizing the exercise
of jurisdiction for "the commission of a tortious act" within
the forum state illustrate more strongly the general desire
of state courts for their long-arm statutes to apply to an
expansive factual range. Such cases offer more compelling
authority for an argument in favor of jurisdiction in Wyoming.
In Foye v. Consolidated Bailing Machine Co.,81 a New
York manufacturer was sued for the negligent manufacture
of a paper press. The court validated jurisdiction under a
statute authorizing jurisdiction for the commission of a
tortious act within the state even though the defendant had
no contacts with the state of Maine except sending the paper
press there. The court declared that a vendor, who by direct
shipment places a dangerous instrumentality in a state which
causes injury in the state, commits a tortious act there. The
court refused to accept the proposition that to exercise jurisdiction would be violative of due process, mainly because of
the purposeful shipment of the article into Maine.
In Vandermee v. District Court, 2 the plaintiff instituted an action for the district court to show cause why an
order quashing service should not be vacated. The plaintiff
had been injured by a crane manufactured by Pettibone
Mulliken Corporation, a Delaware corporation. The statute
authorized jurisdiction over a nonresident guilty of "the commission of a tortious act within this state." 8 In ordering that
81. 229 A.2d 196 (Me. 1967).
82. 433 P.2d 335 (Colo. 1967).
83. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-26(1) (c)

(Supp. 1966).
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jurisdiction be exercised, the court noted the similarity of
Colorado's statute and the Illinois statute in Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. 4 and said that the
phrase "tortious act" implies "the total act embodying the
cause and the effect through the continuum of time." 5 Rejecting an argument that the tortious act occurred outside the
state of Colorado where the defective design was accomplished,
the court said that the defective design was not a tortious act
but an "unclassified nonentity".86 The court reasoned that
when the defect caused injury in Colorado "the act that
caused the defect at that time became a tortious act, and in
our view, it had situs in Colorado."87 With regard to a due
process argument, the court reasoned that since Pettibone
was connected with an independent distributor in Colorado,
this indicated that Pettibone had set up channels for marketing in Colorado and should be expected to answer a suit there.
Two cases decided in Tennessee have upheld jurisdiction
over nonresidents under a statute authorizing jurisdiction
over a nonresident for "any tortious act or omission by it
within this State.""8 In Hanvy v. Crossman Arms Co.' the
plaintiff sued the New York corporate manufacturer of an
air rifle which had been shipped loaded and went off when
the plaintiff unloaded it at a warehouse. The defendant had
no other contacts with Tennessee. The Tennessee court noted
the similarity of the Tennessee statute to the statute in Gray
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp." and assumed that the Tennessee Legislature expected a similar interpretation. The court noted that Tennessee was the place
and society in which the plaintiff's injuries must be fixed
and that the overall economics of the suit dictated that Tennessee should be the place where the suit was maintained.
Later, in Jasper v. McCollum Aviation, Inc.," the Tennessee
court extended its reasoning even further. The parties in the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Supra note 20.
Vandermee v. District Court, supra note 82, at 337.
Id.
Id. at 337-38.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-235(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
466 S.W.2d 214 (Tenn. 1971).
Supra note 20.
497 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1972).
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case were involved in a misrepresentations dispute and all
the acts amounting to the alleged misrepresentations had
probably occurred outside Tennessee. In holding that the
Tennessee statute authorized the exercise of jurisdiction, the
court stated "for even if all the tortious acts in a case were
committed outside the State of Tennessee, as in Hanvy, but
the resulting tortious injury was sustained within the state,
then the tortious acts and the injury are inseparable and
jurisdiction lies in Tennessee.""
The Washington Supreme Court has decided several
cases in favor of exercising jurisdiction under a statute
authorizing jurisdiction over nonresidents accountable for
"the commission of a tortious act within this state."93 It is
evident that the Washington court subscribes to the theory
that a tortious act is committed in the state where the injury
occurs." The Washington Supreme Court has laid out a
rather extensive list of factors to be considered in making
a due process determination in a recent case upholding nonresident jurisdictional authority in the Washington courts:
1) The nonresident defendant must purposefully
do some act or consummate some transaction in
the forum state.
2) The cause of action must arise from such act or
transaction.
3) The assumption of jurisdiction must not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice, considering:
a) The quality, nature, and extent of activities
in the forum,
b) The relative convenience of the parties,
c) The benefits and protections of the laws of
the forum extended to both parties, and
d) The basic equities of the situation."
92. Id. at 242.
93. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185(1) (b) (1962).
94. Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305, 307 (1963). Golden Gate
Hop Ranch, Inc. v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 66 Wash. 2d 649, 403 P.2d 351,
353 (1965).
95. Smith v. York Food Mach. Co., 81 Wash. 2d 719, 504 P.2d 782, 784 (1972).
The court derived many of the guidelines from Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien
Steel Prod. Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963), and Deutsch v.
West Coast Mach. Co., 80 Wash. 2d 707, 497 P.2d 1311, 1314 (1972). The
Smith case also comments on the stream of commerce doctrine.
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The Oregon Supreme Court has also upheld the exercise
of jurisdiction under a similar statute." In State ex rel.
Western Seed Production Corp. v. Campbell, 7 the Oregon
plaintiff sued an Arizona seed manufacturer for defects in
seeds which caused crop damage. The court indicated a
desire that the statute apply to its outer limits and reasoned
that manufacturers who desire a nationwide market should
be prepared to defend suits anywhere. The court said the
manufacturer should have foreseen the possibility that the
seeds would be utilized in Oregon and that jurisdiction was
therefore properly exercisable in the case.
3. Other Statutes
Although considering a different type of statute, 8 the
Arizona Supreme Court in Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass
Corp." made some particularly interesting comments on the
subject of nonresident jurisdiction. In the case, the plaintiff
was injured when a baking dish manufactured by the Ohio
defendant broke. Due to defects in the plaintiff's pleadings,
the court framed the issues on the assumptions that:
1) before the injury, the defendant's sole contact
with Arizona was the presence of a single defective product, and
2) the product was sold to the plaintiff outside
Arizona, and
3) after the injury, the defendant had other products in Arizona.
The court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction. It commented
that the "purposeful availment" test must be relaxed in tort
cases because the tortfeasor rarely considers the effect of
a state's law to guide its actions there. The court stated
that a manufacturer should almost always be able to foresee
that its products will be used anywhere, although in the
96. ORE. REV. STAT. § 14.035(1) (b) (1974), "The commission of a tortious act
within this state."
97. 250 Ore. 262, 442 P.2d 215 (1968).
98. ARiz. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (2) provides that Arizona courts can exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents who have "caused an event to occur in this state
out of which the claim which is the subject of the complaint arose."
99. 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732, 19 A.L.R.3d 1 (1966).
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court's opinion foreseeability by the manufacturer of such
use is not a prerequisite to due process fairness.
All of the cases just discussed indicate an inclination
by state courts to have their long-arm statutes apply despite
any semantic interpretation that might be attached to the
literal wording of the statute. Although the statutory provisions read "tortious act within the state," the courts were
satisfied to uphold jurisdiction when only the injury occurred
in the forum state. It was of no consequence where the
defect-producing act occurred. It is desirable that a similar
interpretation be given to Section 5-4.2(a) (iii) of the Wyoming Statutes, which reads "causing tortious injury by an
act or omission in this state." Admittedly, the literal reading of this provision indicates that perhaps "tortious injury"
and "act" are separate entities. However, an interpretation
of this statutory provision to include all situations where
injury occurs in Wyoming would be consistent with other
states' interpretations and with the legislative purpose' 0
of Wyoming's long-arm statute.
D. The Case Favoring Jurisdiction:Federal
1. Committing a Tort "In Whole or in Part" in the Forum
A substantial number of federal court decisions have
upheld the exercise of jurisdiction in cases decided under
statutes authorizing jurisdiction for the "commission of a
tortious act in whole or in part" in the forum state. 1 ' Most
of these cases employ similar rationales as in state court
decisions, though usually exploring the due process question
in somewhat more detail.
The federal courts are generally no more restrictive
in their due process analyses than state courts. In Gill v.
100. Ch. 237, [1967] Session Laws of Wyoming 689.
101. Aftanase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965); Deveny v.
Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) ; Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons
Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960); Gill v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp., 312 F. Supp. 916 (D.N.H. 1970); Look v. Hughes Tool Co.,
367 F. Supp. 1003 (D.N.H. 1973); Higginbotham v. United Iron &
Metal Co., 228 F. Supp. 513 (W.D. Mo. 1964); Williams v. Vick Chem. Co.,
279 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Iowa 1967); Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co.,
224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Texas 1963).
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FairchildHiller Corp.,"2 the issue revolved around a plane
crash in New Hampshire. The court reasoned that airplane
manufacturers are chargeable with knowledge that airplanes
travel around, so there was no justification for a suggested
requirement that the plaintiffs be forced to demonstrate
that the defendants were likely to have foreseen that the
plane would be in New Hampshire. The court reasoned that
for such products, the risk of suit anywhere is a risk that
manufacturers must bear. In Look v. Hughes Tool Co.,'
the court reasoned that the fact that a utility pole hole digger
was mounted on wheels gave the Delaware corporate defendant a reasonable expectation that the machine would be used
in New Hampshire. Finally, in Williams v. Vick Chemical
Co.,' the only allegations relevant to the defendant's contact with the Iowa forum made in the plaintiff's complaint
were that the defendant (somewhere) made pills taken by
the plaintiff's decedent and that the pills were sold in Iowa.
The court said that such allegations "though minimal, are
sufficient to give this court jurisdiction over the defendants
under the requirements of due process."....
2. "Committing a Tortious Act" in the Forum
Similarly, federal courts have often upheld a court's
jurisdictional authority under statutes providing for jurisdiction for the "commission of a tortious act" within the
forum.' °6 Some United States Supreme Court authority for
such a proposition is found in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Corp.,' a case decided by Mr. Justice Goldberg on an
application for a stay filed by Rosenblatt. A New York statSupra note 101.
Supra note 101.
Supra note 101.
Id. at 837.
Fullmer v. Sloan's Sporting Goods Co., Inc., 277 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.
N.Y. 1967) ; McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill.
1961);
1961); Anderson v. Penncraft Tool Co., 200 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Ill.
Keckler v. Brookwood County Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965);
Fayette v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Tenn.
1967). Although under a slightly different statute, MONT. R. Civ. P.
4 (B) (1) (b), which provides "The commission of any act which results in
accural within this state of a tort action," the federal district court for
Montana has also upheld nonresident jurisdiction in Bullard v. Rhodes
Paramacol Co., Inc., 263 F. Supp. 79 (D. Mont. 1967), and Continental Oil
Co. v. Atwood & Morrill Co., 265 F. Supp. 692 (D. Mont. 1967).
107. 86 S.Ct. 1 (1965), appeal denied, 382 U.S. 110 (1965).
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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ute authorizing jurisdiction over the nonresident who committed a tortious act within the state was held to adequately
cover Rosenblatt, who was living in Italy but had been in
New York for the purpose of making a purchase connected
with a conspiracy to convert trade secrets. Mr. Justice Goldberg rejected Rosenblatt's argument that to subject him to
the jurisdiction of New York courts would deny him due
process of law. He reasoned that the rationale of International Shoe Co. v. Washington"'5 supports statutes like the
one in New York. It is fair, according to Mr. Justice Goldberg, to subject a person to a state's jurisdiction when he
goes there for the purpose of committing a tort. The overall
authoritative value of this decision and its extrapolative
effect are questionable, but it does give some indication of
one former Supreme Court justice's attitude toward such
statutes.
In general, federal decisions relating to statutes based
on the "commission of tortious act" within the forum also
follow the same rationales as similar state court decisions.
The decision in Keckler v. Brookwood County Club"'9 is interesting due to its discussion of the jurisdictional analysis visa'-vis the products liability theory of strict liability. The
case actually sustained a motion to quash service for lack
of personal jurisdiction but gave the plaintiff five days in
which to amend its complaint to contain allegations sufficient
to sustain jurisdiction in accordance with the opinion. The
court required allegations sufficient to demonstrate that the
defendant engaged in a distribution pattern or volume of
business from which an inference that the defendant benefitted from national commerce could be drawn.
3. "Due Process" Statutes
New Jersey1 ' and Rhode Island111 have statutes which
authorize the exercise of jurisdiction to the constitutional
108.
109.
110.
111.

Supra note 8.
Supra note 106.
N.J. R. Civ. P. 4:4-4(e).
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (1956) provides:
Every foreign corporation . . . that shall have the necessary minimum contacts with the State of Rhode Island, shall be subject to
the jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island and the courts of
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limits of due process. Under such provisions, the federal
district court for New Jersey has upheld the jurisdiction of
its courts in products liability cases." 2 The decision in Reilly
v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc."' is notable because it contrasts
with the state court opinions in Oliver v. American Motors
Corp."4' and Pellegriniv. Sachs & Sons."' In the Reilly case,
the plaintiff had purchased a car in Wisconsin from the
defendant. The plaintiff then moved to New Jersey and was
injured by a malfunction of the car's jack. The court reasoned that the defendant could easily have foreseen that the
car would go to other states and that it was therefore not
violative of due process for the New Jersey court to exercise
jurisdiction over the Wisconsin defendant. The court also
considered the facts that the accident and witnesses were in
New Jersey and the relative convenience of the parties in
arriving at its decision.
The sparsity of the defendant's contact with the forum
state is also notable in Rosen v. Savant Instruments,"' a case
decided under the provisions of the Rhode Island "limits of
due process statute".'17 The Rosens sued Savant for the
death of their son who was electrocuted while performing a
laboratory experiment utilizing equipment manufactured
by Savant's corporate predecessor.
The case was originally filed in New York and Savant
moved for a transfer of the case to Rhode Island. The New
York court was prepared to grant the transfer if Rhode
Island had proper juisdiction. The only contact which Savant
had with the State of Rhode Island was that its corporate
predecessor, Servo-Nuclear Corporation, had sold the equipment at issue to Brown University several years earlier.
Under these facts, the New York court allowed the transfer,

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

this state shall hold such foreign corporations amenable to suit
in Rhode Island in every case not contrary to the provisions of
the constitution of laws of the United States.
Reilly v. Phil Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205 (D.N.J. 1974);
Reilly v. P. J. Wolff & Sohne, 374 F. Supp. 775 (D.N.J. 1974).
Supra note 112.
Supra note 54.
Supra note 56.
264 F. Supp. 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
Text quoted s-upra note 111.
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declaring that although under the New York jurisdictional
standards jurisdiction would probably be lacking, under the
Rhode Island statute extending jurisdiction to its full constitutional limits there was a sufficient basis for exercising
jurisdiction consonant with due process of law.
These New Jersey and Rhode Island cases are somewhat
indicative of how due process limitations on jurisdiction may
well be less restrictive than when the additional parameter
of a long-arm statute's literal applicability is added to the
jurisdictional matrix. It is perhaps ironic to the plaintiff's
attorney that long-arm statutes, ostensibly designed to expand personal jurisdiction, often limit it somewhat by adding an additional barrier of statutory applicability. However, this factor may well be the best and only hope for a
defendant faced with a burdensome suit in a distant forum.
E. Jurisdiction in Products Liability Cases: Review
Decisions which deny jurisdiction in products liability
cases often turn upon the court's interpretation of the applicability of a long-arm statute. Such dispositions of cases
are not desirable because they do not satisfy the general longarm purpose of expanding jurisdiction. Resolution of a case
on this basis also means that the court never reaches the
basic question- the due process analysis for the exercise
of jurisdiction. Limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction
should stem from the due process analysis, not from an
interpretation of statutory applicability per se.
On the other hand, there are legitimate due process considerations which may justify the denial of jurisdiction. For
example, requiring a distant car dealer to answer a suit in
a state to which the automobile purchaser has moved may
well impose too stringent a burden upon the defendant. In
cases decided upon considerations of due process, the denial
of jurisdiction is unfortunate to the plaintiff, but it is at
least grounded in what is proposed as the most legitimate
concern in the jurisdictional inquiry.
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Decisions which uphold the exercise of jurisdiction in
products liability cases more accurately reflect the commercial and judicial realities of the modern American system.
The desirability or necessity of a plaintiff maintaining a
suit in his home forum is sustained by such cases. The judicial trend of expanding the substantive legal causes of action
in products liability cases should also be accompanied by a
liberal approach to the jurisdictional question. It does a
plaintiff little good, for example, if his state follows a theory
of strict liability if he cannot avail himself of that protection
by suing in his home forum.
A state is likely to have a significant interest in providing a forum for redress of claims for injury brought by
its residents. This is particularly true for a state like Wyoming, which has little manufacturing industry but does have
industry which utilizes "foreign" manufactured equipment
to a great extent and has consumers heavily dependent upon
products produced elsewhere.
In the products liability situation, the likely presence
of witnesses and medical personnel in the plaintiff's home
forum also heavily favors the exercise of jurisdiction in that
forum. In fact, important defense witnesses who might
testify to the issues of contributory negligence or negligent
maintenance are also likely to be in the plaintiff's forum.
It is suggested that the exercise of jurisdiction in products liability cases should become the rule rather than the
exception. That is, a court should be predisposed to exercise
jurisdiction in the absence of a demonstration of extreme
hardship or unfairness by the defendant.
JURISDICTION IN DEFAMATION CASES

There has been a substantial amount of litigation concerning the extent to which a person allegedly defamed by
a publication may expect the nonresident publisher to come
to the person's home forum and defend a suit there. This
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol11/iss2/8
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litigation is interesting not only because of its applicability
to libel and slander suits themselves, but also because of
the potental extrapolative authoritative value of such decisions into other areas of law such as products liability litigation. Although cases involving jurisdiction in libel suits
are often clouded by technical considerations of the single or
multiple publication rules and sometimes by a purported
effect of the First Amendment, jurisdictional decisions in
this field of the law are quite illustrative of the general
problems encountered in the jurisdictional inquiry.
A. The Case Against the Exercise of Jurisdiction
1. The Case Law
In 1959, prior to the decision in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,1 ' the Seventh Circuit was
faced with a jurisdictional challenge in a libel suit and had
to consider the applicability of Section 17(1) (b) of Chapter
110 of the Illinois Statutes."' In Insull v. New York, WorldTelegram Corp.,"' the Illinois plaintiff sued a number of
publishers, none of whom had any contacts with the state
of Illinois except sending from 37 to 38 copies of their respective papers into Illinois daily, and none of whom printed the
papers in Illinois. After deciding that such activities did not
constitute "doing business" in Illinois, the court went on to
consider whether the papers had committed a tortious act in
Illinois. The court reasoned that since none of the defendants
had been present in Illinois, they had not committed a tortious act in Illinois. The court further declared that in
Illinois, the technical rule as to publication in libel was that
Illinois followed the single publication rule. A prior Illinois
case had held that for multistate materials, publication (the
act necessary to render the printer liable) was complete
upon the first printing of the materials. Therefore, the
1
commission of the tortious act occurred outside Illinois. '2
118. Supra note 20.
119. ILL. Ruv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1) (b) (1959). The statute provided for jurisdiction for "The commission of a tortious act within this state."
120. 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959).
121. This rationale may no longer be valid after the decision in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra note 20. A federal district
court for Illinois has refused to follow the Insull doctrine. Process Church
of the Final Judgment v. Sanders, 338 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. IlL 1972).
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Jurisdiction was denied in the case. Although the Insull case
is generally not followed, it has had the effect of making
the issue of whether a forum abides by the single or multiple
publication rule an issue of controversy in the jurisdictional
determination.
There have been proportionately a large number of libel
jurisdiction cases decided by the Fifth Circuit. In several
such cases, 2 ' the Fifth Circuit has denied the existence of
a sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. Two of
the cases123 involved an analysis of whether the publisher's
activities constituted "doing business" in the forum state of
Mississippi. In another of these cases,124 the court framed the
issue as whether the defendant's business activities constituted "minimum contacts". The court, noting other decisions,
agreed that the circulation of newspapers in a forum and
engaging in newsgathering activities in the forum did not
constitute "doing business" and denied jurisdiction.
Curtis PublishingCo. v. Birdsong1 ' is notable primarily
because it illustrates that a forum with no interest in the
outcome of the libel litigation should probably not exercise
jurisdiction. In the case, Birdsong (who was the Commander
of the Mississippi State Highway Patrol) and others sued
Curtis Publishing and the Saturday Evening Post in Alabama on the basis of an article describing Mississippi Highway Patrol involvement in the James Meredith incident.
None of the alleged incidents had occurred in Alabama, none
of the plaintiffs were from Alabama, all the witnesses were
outside Alabama, and the author and publishers had no
contacts with Alabama except the distribution of the article
Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1964); Buckley v. New York
Times Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong,
360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966); New York Times Co' v. Connor, 365 F.2d
167 (5th Cir. 1966); Talcott v. Midnight Publishing Corp., 427 F.2d 1277
(5th Cir. 1970).
123. Walker v. Savell, supra note 122. This case also laid the foundation for
later cases requiring greater showings of contact due to First Amendment
considerations when the court stated, at 544, that "we think there is a
peculiar significance in the application of this rule [doing business] to
foreign corporations or parties that may be clothed with some of the constitutional protections dealing with freedom of the press." See also Talcott
v. Midnight Publishing Corp., supra note 122.
124. Buckley v. New York Times Co., supra note 122.
125. Supra note 122.
122.
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there. Under this factual setting, the Fifth Circuit denied
jurisdiction in Alabama. A concurring opinion indicated
that had the aggrieved parties been Alabama residents, jurisdiction might have been authorized. But in the absence of
such facts, there was no Alabama state interest in the outcome of the litigation.
The most notable decision denying jurisdiction in the
Fifth Circuit was New York Times Co. v. Connor.2 The
applicable statute127 in that case authorized the exercise of
jurisdiction "as broad as the permissible limits of due process." At issue was an article written by Harrison Salisbury,
a reporter who had been in Alabama for five days researching the allegedly libelous article. The New York Times Co.
had no offices in Alabama, obtained from 25/1000 to 46/1000
of one percent of its advertising revenue from Alabama,
and had an average circulation of 395 daily and 2455 Sunday newspapers in Alabama.
The Fifth Circuit had previously disposed of the Connor
by assuming that Alabama followed the single publication rule and that therefore the publication of the libel
and its concomitant tortious conduct did not occur in Alabama. Shortly thereafter, the Alabama Supreme Court announced that it followed the multiple publication rule. 120 The
Fifth Circuit responded by vacating its original Connor's
decision and rehearing the case.
case 2 '

Additionally, the Fifth Circuit had previously held that
the commission of a single tort in Alabama satisfied the
requisites of due process for the exercise of jurisdiction in
Elkhart Engineering Corp. v. Dornier Werke.' 0 Faced with
the Alabama Supreme Court ruling on the multiple publication rule and the Elkhart decision, the Fifth Circuit sought
to resolve the Connor libel issue. The court resolved the issue
Supra note 122.
ALA. CODE tit 7, § 199(1) (1959).
New York Times Co. v. Connor, 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1961).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd
on other grounds, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
130. 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965). The case involved the propriety of exercising jurisdiction in the context of a single airplane crash in Alabama.

126.
127.
128.
129.
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by adopting a rule that the First Amendment requires a
greater showing of contact in libel cases in order that jurisdiction may be exercised. 3 ' The propriety of this rule has
often been challenged and will be discussed in a later section
of this article. Nevertheless, the effect of this decision and
its rule with regard to the First Amendment has been to
make such considerations another issue of controversy in
the libel jurisdictional determination.'
The Tenth Circuit has twice considered the question of
libel in the jurisdictional context. 8 At issue in both cases
was whether an Oklahoma statute' authorizing the exercise
of jurisdiction over foreign corporations "doing business" in
Oklahoma authorized jurisdiction over the defendants. The
court dismissed both cases, deciding that sending a syndicated column into a state and that sending 26 daily copies
of a newspaper into a state does not constitute "doing business" in the state.
There has also been a libel jurisdiction case decided
under the Rhode Island "minimum contacts" statute discussed in a previous section of this article.'35 In Riverhouse
Publishing Co. v. Porter,"8' Riverhouse sued Sylvia Porter, a
131. "First Amendment considerations surrounding the law of libel require a
greater showing of contact to satisfy the due process clause than is
necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other types of tortious activity."
New York Times Co. v. Connor, supra note 122, at 572.
132. See also Margoles v. Johns, 333 F. Supp. 942 (D.D.C. 1971) for a decision employing this rationale to deny jurisdiction in a slander case under a
statute providing for exercising jursdiction for "causing tortious injury
in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of
Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other
persistent cause of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed, or services rendered in the District of Columbia."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a) (4) (1967). The case also decided that jurisdiction did not attach to one outside the District of Columbia who made
slanderous phone calls into the District of Columbia under D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 13-423 (a) (3) (1967), which provided "causing tortious injury in the
District of Columbia by an act or omission in the District of Columbia."
133. Walker v. General Features Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963); Walker
v. Field Enterprises, 332 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1964). Both cases arose out
of the same factual situation. The plaintiff Walker was suing for an
allegedly defamatory article which appeared in the Oklahoma City Times.
General Features Corp. was a syndication organization from New York
which was connected with the article which appeared in the Oklahoma City
Times. Field Enterprises was the publisher of the Chicago Daily News
which also circulated copies of the article in Oklahoma City.
134. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.204a (1961).
135. R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (1956). Text quoted supra note 111.
136. 287 F. Supp. 1 (D.R.I 1968).
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columnist, and her syndicator, Hall Syndicate, for an article
they published condemning phony awards schemes. Riverhouse was the publisher of a book called Leading Men in the
United States of America and claimed that the article damaged them as publishers of the book. The only contact which
Sylvia Porter had with Rhode Island was that she had visited
there once in 1951 to receive an honorary degree. Hall Syndicate was a New York corporation which had no contacts with
Rhode Island except sending syndicated features there and
sending agents there two or three times a year to solicit
sales of its syndicated features. The contracts for these transactions were consummated in New York. Under these facts,
the court denied jurisdiction in the case, reasoning that Sylvia
Porter's one visit to Rhode Island could not subject her to
jurisdiction there and that Hall Syndicate's solicitation of
business was also an insufficient contact.
2. The Case Against Jurisdiction: Review
Based on these authorities concerning jurisdiction in
libel suits, the potential plaintiff can be seen to have four
obstacles to overcome in asserting jurisdiction over the nonresident publishers. Not only must he fit his case into the
statutory scheme and demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with due process; he must also overcome libel "publication" rules and meet the argument that
the First Amendment adds further constraints to the exercise of jurisdiction.
As in the products liability cases, the fact that the libel
plaintiff faces additional burdens such as statutory applicability, publication rules, and First Amendment constraints
tends unnecessarly to obscure the ultimate due process analysis. The publication rules of libel have been intertwined with
the statutory applicability inquiry with the result that a
court declares that the statute by its terms does not authorize
the exercise of jurisdiction. As the subsequent discussion
in this article demonstrates, many courts have rejected this
approach which effectively resolves a case without reference
to considerations of fairness under the due process analysis.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1976

35

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 11 [1976], Iss. 2, Art. 8

592

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XI

Similarly, the First Amendment constraints sometimes
attached to the libel jurisdictional analysis increase the plaintiff's burden in the due process context. Subsequent discussion demonstrates that this approach has been widely criticized and rejected by courts which adopt a more desirable
approach by relegating the effect of the First Amendment
to the substantive issues in a libel suit.
B. The Case Favoring the Exercise of Jurisdiction
1. Statutes and Due Process
Probably the most widely recognized opinion upholding
jurisdiction in a libel action is the decision in Buckley v. New
York Post Corp.'37 The plaintiff, a Connecticut resident, sued
the New York Post Corporation, a Delaware corporation with
its principal place of business in New York, to recover damages for libel. The pertinent Connecticut statute allowed
jurisdiction for causes of action arising "out of tortious conduct in this state.""' The New York Post Corporation sent
approximately 1707 daily and 2100 weekend editions of its
papers into Connecticut. In the opinion, Judge Friendly
reasoned that distributing copies of a libelous article in a
state amounted to tortious conduct in the state and that
the statutory provision was therefore applicable. Recognizing that the "last necessary event" theory of the FirstRestatement of Conflicts has fallen into disregard for choice of law
problems, Judge Friendly said the doctrine nonetheless has
an application in the jurisdictional context in libel suits and
supports the notion that jurisdiction may be exercised in
the forum where the damage is done to the plaintiff. With
regard to due process considerations, Judge Friendly noted
that in the nondefamation context, even if a tort committed
had been a wholly isolated event, this would be sufficient
to sustain the exercise of jurisdiction. A different rule was
not adopted for this libel case. The effect of the First Amendment was dismissed as not applicable and jurisdiction was
upheld, the court declaring that "inflicting harm within a
state would appear to meet whatever further constitutional
137. 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967).
138. CONN. GUN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411(c) (4)

(1959).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol11/iss2/8

36

Shockey: Nonresident Jurisdiction in Wyoming: An Analysis of Jurisdiction

1976

COMMENT

593

requirement may arise from 'territorial limitations on the
power of the respective states'." '
Despite several cases denying jurisdiction in libel suits,"'
the Fifth Circuit has also upheld such jurisdiction on some
occasions. The decision in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino...
is interesting because it makes a distinction between newspaper libels and magazine libels. Decided under a Louisiana
statute which had been interpreted by Louisiana courts to
permit the exercise of jurisdiction to the "constitutionally
permissible limits",14 the court reasoned that magazine publishers, unlike newspaper publishers, often seek to exploit
a national market for their publications. For this reason,
the court felt that a magazine published may more reasonably be expected to defend suits on a nationwide basis. For
the same reason, the court rationalized that First Amendment considerations surrounding jurisdiction in libel cases
did not apply as strictly to a magazine publisher because
due to his nationwide market the magazine publisher is less
likely to be affected by a "chilling effect" of a suit in a
foreign forum.
The most recent Fifth Circuit decision in this area is
Edwards v. Associated Press,"' a case involving a dispute
over an Associated Press wire dispatch. The news release
originated in Louisiana and was channeled to Mississippi,
where the plaintiff was a county sheriff. The applicable
4 authorized jurisdiction over those "who shall comstatute"
mit a tort in whole or in part [in Mississippi] against a resident [of Mississippi]." The court said that the language of
the statute clearly encompassed the acts involved. With
regard to due process, the court noted that the defendant
had a fairly substantial amount of contacts with Mississippi, 4 and reasoned that Mississippi, as the home state of
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Buckley v. New York Post Corp., supra note 137, at 181.
See cases cited, eupra note 122.
383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967).
id. at 589 n.4.
512 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1975).
Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57 (1972 Cum. Supp.).
Associated Press had five correspondents and one maintenance person in
Mississippi and maintained an office there. The court also considered the
fact that the news release was apparently aimed exclusively at Mississippi,
which indicated a purposeful connection by AP with the State of Mississippi.
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the plaintiff, had a strong interest in giving its residents a
forum in which to vindicate their claims.
Other federal courts have also upheld the exercise of
jurisdiction in libel cases on the theory that the distribution
of libelous materials in a state amounts to "the commission
of a tortious act" within the state, 4 ' or gives rise to a cause
of action arising "out of tortious conduct in this state,"'. 47
or amounts to committing "a tort in whole or in part" in a
state against a resident of the state.'
In one of these decisions, substantial weight was given to the plaintiff's rights
in the due process context when the court declared:
It makes infinitely more sense to convene a libel
trial where the damage has occurred, i.e., where the
witnesses of the plaintiffs reputation and the damage thereto are available. The burden for travel
and litigation expense should be on the party that
has caused the damage, especially in the case where
the defendant is a national distributor and should
foresee a possibility of litigation arising from its
activities. 4 '
State courts have also adhered to the notion that causing
libelous or slanderous materials to be distributed in a state
is an adequate basis for jurisdiction. In Thiry v. Atlantic
Monthly Co.,"' a Seattle, Washington, architect sued Atlantic
Monthly in federal district court for damages from a libelous
magazine article which was distributed in Washington. The
jurisdictional question was certified to the Washington Supreme Court which held that the distribution of the defamatory material in Washington satisfied the requirements of
a statute conferring jurisdiction over those guilty of "the
commission of a tortious act within this state."'' . The court
146. The Process Church of the Final Judgment v. Sanders, supra note 121,
at 1400. Here, the court found that on the basis of the Illinois interpretation of the Illinois statute in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., supra note 20, the causing of injury in Illinois was sufficient to sustain the exercise of jurisdiction. The court rather emphatically
rejected the rationale in Insull v. New York, World-Telegram Corp., supra
note 120.
147. Johnston v. Time, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 837 (M.D.N.C. 1970).
148. Casano v. WDSU-TV, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1970).
149. The Process Church of the Final Judgment v. Sanders, supra note 146,
at 1400.
150. 445 P.2d 1012 (Wash. 1968).
151. WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.28.185(1) (b) (1961).
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reasoned that because the damage occurred in Washington,
that was also where the tortious act occurred. Under a
statute with the same wording,' the court in State ex rel.
Advanced DictatingSupply, Inc. v. Dale... said that jurisdiction must be exercised over a nonresident defendant who
called by telephone and mailed into Oregon slanderous and
libelous statements. With regard to due process considerations, the court adopted the rationale of Murphy v. ErwinWasey, Inc.,"' to the effect that a person who knowingly
sends a false statement into a state "purposefully avails"
himself of the privileges of a state and "acts" there for
jurisdictional purposes.
The Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey"' case is an interesting
case for the libel jurisdictional analysis, although it actually
involved an issue of a nonresident sending a fraudulent
misrepresentation into Massachusetts. The pertinent statutory provision authorized jurisdiction over nonresidents
"causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this commonwealth."" 6 The court phrased the issue as "whether the
delivery in Massachusetts by mail or telephone of a false
statement originating outside the state, followed by reliance
in Massachusetts, is an 'act... within this commonwealth'."' ' 7
The following quotation represents the court's decision in
the case, as well as its due process analysis:
[W]here a defendant knowingly sends into a state
a false statement, intending that it should there be
relied upon to the injury of a resident of that state,
he has for jurisdictional purposes, acted within that
state. The element of intent also persuades us that
there can be no constitutional objection to Massachusetts asserting jurisdiction over the out-of-state
sender of a fraudulent misrepresentation, for such
a sender has thereby "purposefully availed" itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the
ORE. Rsv. STAT. § 14.035(b) (1974).
524 P.2d 1404 (Ore. 1974).
460 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1972).
Id.
MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3(c) (1974). This provision is the
same as Wyo. STAT. § 5-4.2(a) (iii) (Supp. 1975).
157. Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc., supra note 154, at 664.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
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forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.158
The case of St. Clair v. Righter' adopted a novel and
far-reaching approach in upholding jurisdictional authority
in a libel action in Virgina. The plaintiff, president of
Jewell Ridge Corporation, sued other members of the corporation for mailing letters charging him with a violation
of his fiducary duties to the corporation. The plaintiff was
a Virginia resident; the letters were mailed from outside
Virginia. The pertinent statute6 0 was the same as Wyoming's statute, authorizing jurisdiction over those causing
tortious injury by an act or omission in Virginia or those
causing tortious injury by an act or omission outside Virginia if they met additional requirements of contact. The
court decided that the statute by its terms did not authorize
the exercise of jurisdiction in the case.
However, jurisdiction was exercised in the St. Clair
case on a different rationale. The court reasoned that longarm statutes merely represent legislative approval for the
exercise of jurisdiction-and that jurisdiction may be exercised beyond the boundaries of the long-arm statute if to do
so would be consistent with due process of law. Even though
a long-arm statute does not authorize jurisdiction, it is within
the scope of judicial power to confer jurisdiction in a case
if to do so comports with due process. Under this rationale, the St. Clair court upheld the exercise of jurisdiction,
considering the following factors in the due process
determination:
1. Virginia's strong state interest in and relation
to the factual situation.
2. The plaintiff's Virginia residency.
3. The sending of the letters into Virginia was a
voluntary action.
4. Virginia was the place where the injury occurred and it should be able to apply its own laws
to protect its residents.
168. Id.
159. 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966).
160. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-81.2(3) and (4)

(Supp. 1975).
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Other courts have not been inclined to step outside the boundaries of their respective long-arm statutes as did the St.
Clair court. The opinion in that case, however, does provide
more insight into the notion that in other cases, long-arm
statutes may well be "jurisdiction-limiting" rather than
"jurisdiction-expanding".
2. Libel Publication Rules
As discussed in a prior section of this article, the technical rule as to the publication of a libel which a jurisdiction
follows will arguably influence the jurisdictional determination. Definitionally, it is useful to distinguish between the
"single" and "mulitple" publication rules for libel. The "single publication rule" has been defined as:
[T]he cause of action for libel is absolutely complete at the time of the first publication; subsequent
appearances or distribution of the periodicals are
of no consequence whatsoever to the creation or
existence of a cause of action but are only relevant
in computing damages."'
The "multiple publication rule" has been described as:
[T]hat each time a libelous article is brought to the
attention of a third person a new publication has
occurred... each publication is a separate actionable tort; ... and... each time a..

magazine con-

taining libelous material is sold or distributed, a
new publication has occurred and a fresh tort has
been committed."'
Whether Wyoming follows the single or multiple publication
rule for libel is a question which has never been directly
ruled upon by the Wyoming Supreme Court.'
The propo161. Insull v. New York, World-Telegram Corp., supra note 120, at n.1.
162. Hartmann v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 134 (3d Cir. 1947).
163. By inference, the rule in Wyoming is probably that of the multiple publication rule. The multiple publication rule was the common law rule. See
RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 578, Comment b; PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 769

(4th ed. 19.71); Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 512 P.2d 702 (Mont.
1973) and cases and authorities cited therein. By statute, Wyoming has
adopted the common law when there is an absence of contrary legislation
or rules, Wyo. STAT. § 8-17 (1957).
In addition, see Spriggs v. Associated Press, 55 F. Supp. 385 (D. Wyo.
1944) where the court adopted a rule to the effect that the initial publisher
of a libel is jointly liable with other parties for any re-publication of a
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sition that the single publication rule should have any effect
on a jurisdictional determination has been rejected by several courts, as the subsequent discussion will demonstrate.
The Montana Supreme Court was recently asked to
decide whether Montana would follow the single or multiple
publication rule. In Lewis v. Reader's Digest Association,
Ihc.,'" the federal district court certified that question to
the Montana Supreme Court. Whether Montana followed
the single or multiple publication rule was viewed as determinative of whether the federal court could exercise jurisdiction over the nonresident publishing firm which had distributed libelous material printed elsewhere in Montana.
The Montana Supreme Court adopted the multiple publication rule, citing a number of reasons for its decision. First,
the multiple publication rule was the common law rule.
Second, the single publication rule is judge-made, designed
for judicial expediency, and does not even fulfill that purpose
properly. Third, adopting the single publication rule and
its concomitant bar to suit except in the place of printing
would be to give the press an "unconscionable" advantage
over the public. Finally, the court said that it preferred a
rule which would allow a plaintiff to sue in his home forum
where the damage had occurred. The court adopted the multiple publication rule and mandated the exercise of jurisdiction in the case. Other cases have also recognized that the
multiple publication rule effectuates the exercise of jurisdiction under statutes providing for jurisdiction over nonresidents for causes of action arising "out of tortious con165
duct in this state.
Many cases have held that even if a jurisdiction follows
the single publication rule, that rule is not pertinent to and
should have no effect on the jurisdictional inquiry. In Bucklibel. The inference to be drawn from this case is that there are potentially
several causes of action for repeated publications of a libel, and this may
support the proposition that the multiple publication rule is the rule in
Wyoming. However, the court in Whitaker v. Denver Post Inc., supra
note 7, assumed that Wyoming follows the single publication rule.
164. Supra note 163.
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (a) (4) (1975) ; see Johnston v. Time, Inc., supra
note 147.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol11/iss2/8

42

Shockey: Nonresident Jurisdiction in Wyoming: An Analysis of Jurisdiction

1976

COMMENT

599

ley v. New York Post Corp., 6 the court recognized three
purposes of the single publication rule-to protect against
a multiplicity of suits, to protect against endless tolling of
the statute of limitations, and to protect from a diversity in
applicable substantive law. The court reasoned that none
of these purposes is furthered by an extension of the effect
of the single publication rule to a jurisdictional level and
stated that the rule should not be used to deprive a plaintiff
of the right to sue in the state where he is defamed.
In a case where the single publication rule was explicitly
effective due to the state's adoption of the Uniform Single
Publication Act, the court declared that in the libel context,
"The Uniform Act clearly was not intended as a limitation
upon a state's jurisdiction including its long-arm jurisdiction."' 7 In Edward v. Associated Press,'68 the court recognized that Mississippi had adopted the single publication rule
for venue purposes. However, the court was not willing to
rule that Mississippi would incorporate the rule into its
jurisdictional decisions and denied the defendant's contention that the single publication rule barred jurisdiction in
the case.
3. First Amendment Considerations
As noted in prior discussion, there has developed in the
libel jurisdiction area a concern that the First Amendment
requires a greater showing of contact with the forum to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction. This was the rationale
for the Fifth Circuit decision in the New York Times Co. v.
Connor... case. This First Amendment aspect of the libel
jurisdiction was weakened slightly by the Fifth Circuit deci7
sion in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino"'
in the case of a
nationally distributed magazine. Arguably, this First Amendment concern has been watered down further by the state166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Supra note 137.
The Process Church of the Final Judgment v. Sanders, supra note 146.
Supra note 143.
Supra note 122.
Supra note 122.
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ment by the Fifth Circuit in Edwards v. Associated Press..1
that, "Connor indicates not so much a rule as it expresses
a cautionary note."
Other courts have flatly rejected any purported effect
of the First Amendment upon a jurisdictional determination.
In Buckley v. New York Post Corp.,' 2 Judge Friendly reasoned that there are significant substantive legal defenses in
libel suits emanating from the First Amendment ' and that
these substantive defenses adequately extend the appropriate
First Amendment protections to the libel defendant. The
decisions in Johnston v. Time, Inc.' 4 and Cordell v. Detective
Publications... also follow this rationale. The cases hold that
free speech considerations are best accommodated once the
substantive issues of the case are on trial-but that the
defendant should not be able to escape a trial of the issues
by imputing a jurisdictional effect to the First Amendment.
The Montana Supreme Court has recently declared that the
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident publisher does
not have a "chilling effect" upon the First Amendment guaranties of free speech and press and declared that, "we believe
that any protection given the press under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution must be balanced
against a citizen's right to protect his reputation and good
name in the community in which he resides against printing
and publication of false defamatory statements.' 7
4. The Case for Jurisdiction: Review
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that some
courts are willing to interpret their long-arm statutes broad171. Supra note 143, at 266. The court also acknowledged, at 266 n.29, that its
decision in Connor "has not been greeted with enthusiasm," and stated
that First Amendment considerations in the case were mitigated by the
fact that Associated Press was able "to apportion the costs of defending
suits like this among a number of its subscribers. Thus, the hazard of
encountering lawsuits upon entry into a particular news market is diluted."
At 268 n.41.
172. Supra note 137.
173. "Hazards to publishers from libel actions have recentely been much mitigated by the development of substantive principles under the First Amendment, notably in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). .. .
Buckley v. New York Post Corp., supra note 127, at 182.
174. Supra note 147.
175. 307 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Tenn. 1968).
176. Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n. Inc., supra note 163, at 706.
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ly enough to encompass a variety of factual situations. One
court was even inclined to disregard the applicable statute altogether and proceeded to sustain an assertion of jurisdiction on purely constitutional grounds. However, as prior
discussion in this article indicates, not all courts are willing
to give their statutes a broad enough application to include
the libel case in every instance. The plaintiff's attorney will
regard this as unfortunate; the defense attorney may have
little other hope of avoiding an extremely inconvenient suit.
The effect of the single publication rule is necessarily
intertwined with the applicability of a long-arm statute. It
is probably fortunate that utilizing this technical rule to
escape jurisdiction is a technique which has fallen into disfavor with the courts. Neither the purposes of the single
publication rule nor of long-arm statutes is likely to be
fulfilled by an approach which utilizes the single publication
rule to deny jurisdiction.
The cases are variable as to the requirements they make
in the due process context. The contacts of some defendants
with a forum state are substantial enough so as to make
this determination relatively easy. It is in cases where only
a few defamatory articles are circulated in the forum that
this determination becomes difficult. In this context, the
controlling factor should probably be the plaintiff's right to
defend his reputation in the forum where it exists-a consideration approved by many courts.
The effect of the First Amendment on jurisdiction is
also linked to the due process determination. But the doctrine,
born of a court determined to justify a prior holding, and
distinguished partly into obscurity by its creating court,
should have little influence on the jurisdictional determination. In this context, the plaintiff's right to defend his reputation at home should probably receive the most weight and
consideration.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The jurisdictional issue is most properly resolved by
reference to the due process guidelines as set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in the International Shoe,'77
McGee,'78 and Hanson.7 cases. Resolution of a jurisdictional
issue on the basis of an interpretation of a long-arm statute's
applicability per se often results in a case being disposed of
without a consideration of due process fundamental fairness
to the parties. Rather than focusing upon the relative rights
of the plaintiff and the defendant, the court which disposes
of a case through a restrictive perception of what the purported scope of a long-arm statute is does not serve the
purpose of such statutes which is to expand the jurisdictional
authority of the court.
Nevertheless, courts generally cannot simply disregard
the terms of a long-arm statute. Few courts are likely to
be willing to disregard the terms of an applicable statute
and simply proceed with a due process analysis as did the
court in the St. Clair v. Righter"° case discussed earlier in
this article. However, this approach to the problem may be
commendable in jurisdictions with statutes restrictive by
their terms or case law which constricts the applicability of
the statutory terms. The notion that a long-arm statute is
merely an authorization to exercise jurisdiction but that jurisdiction may be exercised beyond the limits of the statute if
doing so would comport with due process is an analytic
approach which facilitates the purpose of expanding jurisdiction to protect litigants in the home forum.
Another way to avoid excessive restrictiveness in the
jurisdictional analysis is to adopt a liberal interpretation of
the terms of the long-arm statute. In general, this line of
analysis has been adopted by a large number of courts in
products liability and defamation litigation. The principal
feature of this analysis is that the causing of an injury in
177.
178.
179.
180.

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra note 8.
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra note 11.
Hanson v. Denckla, upra note 15.
Supra note 159.
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a forum is interpreted as satisfying any statutory requirements of doing an "act" within the forum. Thus, regardless of the wording of the applicable statute, causing an
injury in a forum is regarded as an act sufficient to trigger
the coverage of the long-arm statute. This analysis is preferrable to any analysis which divides the "acts" of making
a defective product (or printing a libel) and the subsequent
injury, because it permits the inquiry to proceed directly to
considerations of due process. It is proposed that a similar
liberal reading should be given to Subsection (a) (iii) of
Wyoming's long-arm statute in order to facilitate the purpose
of the statute.
In the absence of such a liberal interpretation of statutory terms, it is proposed that legislative action is necessary
to protect the interests of Wyoming's citizens adequately.
In place of the current statutory provisions, it is proposed
that the legislature adopt a jurisdictional statute which
authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction to the constitutionally
permissible limits. Decisions in states which have such statutory provisions are made strictly on due process considerations and tend to afford an analysis most mindful of the
relative rights of all parties concerned.
Regardless of how the court arrives at the point of making a due process analysis of the jurisdictional issue, it is
further proposed that a liberal approach be adopted in this
regard as well. Due to social and demographic factors somewhat unique to Wyoming, the jurisdictional due process
analysis in Wyoming should be broad in regard to these
social factors.
In the products liability context, courts always studiously apply the guidelines propounded by the United States
Supreme Court, although the results are variable. Additionally, special attention is often given to the volume of
business done by the foreign manufacturer in the forum and
the foreseeability that a product might find its way to the
forum. These factors of volume of business and forseeability
should be analyzed in relation to factors unique to Wyoming,
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such as Wyoming's sparse population and industrial practices. It is a mistake, for example, to use as a guideline the
quantitative volume of business done by a foreign corporation in New York or Connecticut adequate to sustain jurisdiction in such states as a comparison for a state like Wyoming. It is hardly likely that a foreign corporation's business
volume in Wyoming will be nearly as high as it would be
in the more populous states. Similarly, Wyoming's consumers
are a "captive audience" for foreign manufacturers due to
the relative dearth of products industry in Wyoming. Whether the product is heavy industrial machinery or a small home
appliance, the commercial reality is that it was probably
manufactured outside the state of Wyoming. It is also likely
that any products have arrived in Wyoming through a complicated series of commercial channels; distributorships,
wholesalers, and the like. A restrictive due process analysis
which concentrates on the small quantitative amount of business done by a foreign corporation in Wyoming or the fact
that an instrumentality arrived in the state through intermediate channels disregards social and commercial realities
and does not fulfill the purpose of expanding court protection
to Wyoming citizens.
In the defamation context, a liberal approach to the
jurisdictional due process analysis is also required by social
and demographic characteristics. As a sparsely settled state
with many small communities, Wyoming citizens are still
dependent upon out-of-state news sources originating in
population centers such as Denver, Salt Lake City, and Billings. This is particularly true for the electronic media, and
generally true for newspapers and other news sources. Concomitantly, it is unlikely that these out-of-state news sources
have substantial quantitative contacts with the state of Wyoming, because their major markets are likely to be in their
own immediate vicinities. These facts, however, do not
lessen the damage done to a Wyoming resident by a defamatory publication or broadcast. It is a harsh result to force
a defamed plaintiff to prove his reputation far away from
his home to a jury ignorant of the plaintiff's social setting
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol11/iss2/8
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simply because the defendant has few quantitative contacts
with the plaintiff's home forum.
A liberal approach to the nonresident jurisdictional issue
in Wyoming is suggested by legal authority and social commercial conditions in the state. An analytic approach which
focuses upon due process considerations rather than statutory terminology is recommended. Through such an approach,
the protection of the courts may be effectively extended to
Wyoming citizens.
GARY L. SHOCKEY
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